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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
WILLIAM JAY ROBBINS, 
Defendant and 
Appellant, pro se, 
vs. 
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Facility, Utah State Prison; 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, Utah 
State Attorney General, 
Case No. 860367 
Classification No. 3 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
000O000 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Appellant was legally arrested. 
2. Whether Amended Information was tainted. 
3. Whether Amended Information was constitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was arrested on February 17, 1984, by Officer Dave 
Helquist, of the Kaysville Police Department. Appellant was told 
that he was being arrested for the uncorroborated claim of 
sexually molesting an eight year old neighbor girl. Appellant 
denied the accusation and attested to his innocence. 
Notwithstanding Appellant's denial, Appellant was immediate-
ly incarcerated in the Davis County Jail. Appellant was not 
presented with a written charge until February 21, 1984, when an 
affidavit stating facts based on INFORMATION AND BELIEF was 
signed by Mike Lee. The affidavit (Information) indicated that 
the complaint was based on information obtained from himself and 
Officer Dave Helquist. 
Appellant moved through the judicial process, which culmin-
ated in his conviction on April 23, 1984. Appellant was incar-
cerated in the Utah State Prison on May 9, 1984, where he has 
since continuously resided. The Second District Court case num-
ber was #4525, before Judge Douglas L. Cornaby. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant contends that his arrest, being contrary to Utah 
law, deprived him of intended constitutional safeguards, and was 
therefore illegal• 
Additionally, Appellant contends that the Information was 
improperly generated by an unscrupulous complainant, who was his 
adversary, and was therefore tainted. 
Finally, Appellant contends that the Information, being 
based on information obtained from complainant himself, and the 
arresting officer, neither having personal knowledge of the facts 
contained therein, was unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S ARREST WAS ILLEGAL 
Arresting Officer Dave Helquist, of the Kaysville Police 
Department, had no justification for incarcerating Appellant 
since he had only the alleged victim's uncorroborated accusation 
against Appellant's claim of innocence at the time of arrest. 
The arrest was made in the manifest face of reasonable 
doubt. Specifically, the alleged victim claimed four other peo-
ple were with her in the house at the time of the alleged offense 
which reportedly occurred over a twenty minute period of time. 
Yet, nevertheless, no corroboration was offered by those four 
people. Appellant submits that Officer Helquist acted contrary 
to U.C.A. 77-7-2(2), and by so doing, acted illegally. 
Further, Appellant does not believe Officer Helquist pre-
sented any magistrate with evidence upon which probable cause 
could have been determined and upon which a valid warrant for 
arrest might issue. Since he could have and should have obtained 
magistrative authority and failed to do so, he acted contrary to 
U.C.A. 77-7-5. This action was illegal. 
Officer Helquist invited Appellant to step from his home to 
talk without informing him of intention, cause, or authority to 
arrest. Appellant was then invited to sit in the police car to 
talk. Appellant was then driven to the Kaysville Police 
Department still without being so informed. At the Kaysville 
Police Department, Appellant was confronted with the alleged 
victim's accusation. Appellant denied the accusation, was 
searched, handcuffed and delivered directly to Davis County Jail, 
where he was incarcerated. Officer Helquist, without justifica-
tion, failed to comply with U.C.A. 77-7-6 as none of the condi-
tions of 77-7-6(1)<2)(3) existed. The entire procedure was 
therefore illegal. 
Finally, Officer Helquist, in his warrantless arrest of 
Appellant, failed to meet any of the requirements of U.C.A. 77-7-
23. Namely, he failed to take Appellant before any magistrate 
and in Information state the charge against Appellant before such 
magistrate. Omission of this procedure in the arrest was 
illegal. 
Officer Helquist's failure to avail Appellant of constitu-
tional safeguards contained in U.C.A. 77-7-2(2), 77-7-5, 77-7-6 
and 77-7-23 was in itself not only a public offense, but it 
deprived Appellant of constitutional safeguards against illegal 
arrest intended by Utah law. 
POINT II 
THE AMENDED INFORMATION WAS TAINTED. 
Because of a notable conflict of interest which complainant 
Mike Lee had in this case, he properly should have deferred to a 
less biased person. Since he did not do so, and for other rea-
sons which follow, the Amended Information developed by Lee was 
seriously tainted• 
Mike Lee had threatened Appellant with criminal charges in a 
serious confrontation about two years prior to his arrest. 
Earlier on the day of Appellants arrest, Mike Lee detained 
Appellant and Appellant's daughter in a confrontation in which 
Lee accused Appellant of a probation violation. 
Prior to Appellant's arrest. Appellant and members of 
Appellent's family were intimidatingly pursued in and around the 
Kaysville area by Mike Lee. Subsequent to Appellant's arrest and 
while on bail, Lee continued this intimidation even into the town 
of Layton where Appellant's family had moved. Lee's intimidation 
continued until Appellant sought and obtained relief through his 
attorney, John Caine. 
Additionally Lee, being an intimate friend of the alleged 
victim's family, was a frequent visitor at their home before and 
after Appellant's arrest. 
Mike Lee had previously been twice suspended from the 
Kaysville Police Department for improper investigative conduct, 
as may be discovered from a cursory review of his employment 
record with the department. 
At the time of Appellant's arrest. Appellant was informed by 
Officer Dave Helquist that Mike Lee had obtained a tape recorded 
statement from the alleged victim under conditions which impro-
perly permitted Lee to be alone with her during the entire pro-
cess. Information obtained by Lee from the alleged victim was 
laced with serious inconsistencies compared with her testimony at 
preliminary hearing and trial. 
The Information, obtained under improper conditions by 
Appellant's unscrupulous adversary, was seriously tainted. 
POINT III 
THE AMENDED INFORMATION WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The affidavit (Amended Information) indicates the complaint 
was based on information obtained from himself (Mike Lee) and 
Officer Dave Helquist. 
Under the United States Constitution, Amendment IV, an 
affidavit stating facts on INFORMATION AND BELIEF is 
insufficient. An officer's affidavit may state facts of which he 
has personal knowledge, and not facts of which he has been 
informed by others. Schenks^v^^lKS^ 2d 185. 
Under Rule 4 of the F.R.C.P., it provides that an arrest 
warrant shall be issued only upon a written and sworn complaint 
showing that there is probable cause to believe that the offense 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed 
it. "An arrest warrant is invalid where the underlying com-
plaint . . • contains no affirmative allegation that the 
complainant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters 
contained therein, does not quote any sources for the 
complainant's belief, and does not set forth any other sufficient 
basis upon which a finding of probable cause could be made; and 
these deficiences cannot be cured by reliance . . . upon a pre-
sumption that the complaint was made on the personal knowledge of 
the matters on which his charge was based." Gigrdenello^v^^U^S^, 
357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503. 
It may be safely argued that Officer Lee had no personal 
knowledge of the alleged incident, but was instead relying on 
information which he browbeat out of the alleged victim in 
secret. 
Further, there is no evidence contained within the four 
corners ot I ho Information, 01 on any supporting documentati on, 
11! in in i h i iiiii i in | 1 i i n II I I in 1 1 in in in I II a , I : . of 
the two teats within the "two-pronged test" of A g u i l § r
—
v i — T e x 5 S f 
378 I J.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelll v = !! • S , 393 U.S. 410 (1969) . 
I t: can. on 1 y be -assumed that 1: :i :i s act Ions res\ 11 :: e n a n 
unconfirmed p. \ insupported , and unsworn statinent which thn Circuit 
I ho 
c h a r g i n g o :f a c r I in e . 
O f f i c e r L e e w a a n o f, ra w i t n e a s o £ knowledge,, a n d a b s e n t I: h e 
s a 11 s :f y i i i g :: :f i tests :f o i t I: :it o d e t €3 r m I n a 1 1 o n :: • :£ p r' o b a b 1 e 
cause, Is whoJ 1 y Incompebent tc make the statements whIch he dId 
against Appellant. 
The Information , „ a s w r i 11, e n, c a n not w i t h s t a n d t h e b r I g h t 
Light of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y t e s t . I s nul l and void, and 
in in ' j il 11 i v e i I in i inI »'i1 • 
The State has indicated that, ai > urie c,3 a l m s r a i s e d I n 
A p( ml l n n t ' h I .il ii ii in in I i Win it it Ilia I inn i I-,IIT pin WH? ^ I nr v, mi iir 
s h o u l d h a v e Luun Known aL t h e Lime J 1 J x i u e L a p p e a l , and u t l o o t 
p i: I o r t o t r i a 1 , a a t h e y c hallenge t h e a r i: e s t w a r r e n t • 
I } ::i 1: 1: :n, i B S p e c t t • :: 11: i o s e :::: J a :i in s , ,. A p p e 1 1 I II i i a 
serious significance • of • 1: 1 me irregularities connected w i, th 
c o m. p 1 a I n a n t M i 1 z e L e e u n 111 h e r ecen 11 y had the opporbunit y o f 
d i s c u s s i n g t h e m w 11 h • ::) t I: i e i: i n in a t e & a t t he p r I son • 
0n 1 y by recent review of b 1 i,e ::£ ew scanby 1 aw b o o k s a v a L i a b l e 
at the Utah State Prison did Appellant become aware of the above 
mentioned higher court rulings concerning the unconstitutional 
nature of the Information used against him. 
Similarly, Appellant did not know of the irregularity of the 
arrest procedure until he recently read the Utah Code. 
Thus, it may be seen that there was no way Appellant could 
have had the knowledge to have raised these claims until now. He 
believes his claims do have merit. He knows that Justice did not 
have her full opportunity in his case, and that it would be 
wholly unconsionable not to reexamine the conviction. 
The State contends that an illegal arrest does not void an 
otherwise valid subsequent conviction. They also contend that 
once the risk of illegal detention is dissipated through a subse-
quent trial, the protection is no longer relevant or necessary 
because other constitutional safeguards have come into play. 
Appellant vehemently takes issue with such a position. Con-
stitutional safeguards apply to arrest procedures, charging docu-
ments (Information), and the trial itself. These constitutional 
safeguards protect against conviction of the innocent. It is 
obvious that such safeguards do not provide a 100* guarantee that 
the innocent will never be convicted. However, if three separate 
safeguards must fail in order to convict the innocent, a greater 
guarantee of protection will exist than if only one safeguard 
stands between the innocent and conviction. 
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ADDENDUM 
n o 
77-7-1. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure UT*H CODE 1986-1987 
77-7-5. Issuance of warrant - Time arrests may be 
made. 
77-7-6. Manner of making arrest. 
77-7-7. Force in making arrest. 
77-7-8. Doors and *indo*s may be broken, *hcn. 
77-7-9. Weapons ma> be taken from prisoner. 
77-7-10. Telegraph or telephone authorization of 
execution of arrest warrant. 
77-7-11. Possession of warrant by arresting officer not 
required. 
77-7-12. Detaining persons suspected of shoplifting -
Persons authorized. 
77-7-13. Arrest without warrant by peace officer -
Reasonable grounds, what constitutes - Exemption from 
civil or criminal liability. 
77-7-14. Person causing detention or arrest of person 
suspected of shoplifting • Civil and criminal immunity. 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect - Grounds. 
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for 
dangerous weapon - Grounds. 
77-7-17. Authority of peace officer to take possession of 
weapons. 
77-7-18. Gtation on misdemeanor or infraction charge. 
77-7-19. Appearance required by citation - Arrest for 
failure to appear - Collection of bail amounts by Office 
of Recovery Services - Motor vehicle violations -
Disposition of fines and costs. 
77-7-20. Service of citation on defendant • Filing in 
jcourl - Contents of citations. 
77-7-21. Proceeding on citation - Voluntary forfeiture 
of bail - Information, when required. 
77-7-22. Failure to appear as misdemeanor. 
77-7-23. Delivery of prisoner arrested without warrant • 
Information - Violation as misdemeanor. 
77-7-1 . "Arrest" defined - Restraint a l lowed. 
A n arrest is an actual restraint of the person arr-
ested or submission to custody. T h e person shall not 
be subjected to any more restraint than is necessary 
for his arrest and detent ion. two 
77-7-2 . By peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under auth-
ority of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a 
person: 
(1) for any public offense commit ted or attempted 
in the presence o f any peace officer; "presence" 
includes all o f the physical senses or any device that 
enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range o f any 
physical sense, or records the observations o f any o f 
the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause t o believe a 
felony has been commit ted and has reasonable cause 
to believe that the person arrested has commit ted it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the 
person has committed a public offense, and there is 
reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commis-
sion of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. I*M 
77-7-3. By private persons. 
A private person may arrest another: 
(1) For a public of fense commit ted or attempted 
in his presence; or 
(2) When a felony has been committed and he has 
reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has 
committed it. \no 
77-7-4. Magistrate may orally order arrest. 
A magistrate may orally require a peace officer to 
arrest anyone committing or attempting to commit a 
public offense in the* presence of the magistrate, 
peace officer to arrest a person for a public offense, 
and thereafter, as soon as practical, an information 
shall be filed against the person arrested. two 
77-7-5. Issuance of warrant - Time arrests may 
be made. 
A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon 
finding probable cause to believe tha! the person to 
be arrested has committed a public offense. If the 
offense charged is: 
(1) A felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be 
made at any t ime o f the day or night; or 
(2) A misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can 
be made at night only if the magistrate has endorsed 
authorization to do so on the warrant. u>*o 
77-7-6 . Manner of making arrest. 
T h e person making the arrest shall inform the 
person being arrested o f his intention, cause and 
authority to arrest h im. Such notice shall not be 
required when: 
(1) There is reason to believe the notice will end-
anger the life or safety o f the officer or another 
person or will likely enable the party being arrested 
to escape; 
(2) The person being arrested is actually engaged 
in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, an 
offense; or 
(3) The person being arrested is pursued immedi-
ately after the commiss ion o f an of fense or an 
escape. two 
77-7-7. Force in making arrest. 
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly 
resists after being informed o f the intention to make 
the arrest, the person arresting may use reasonable 
force to effect the arrest. Deadly force may be used 
only as provided in section 76-2-404. \m 
77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, 
when. 
To make an arrest, a private person, if the 
offense is a felony, and in all cases, a peace officer, 
may break the door or window of the building in 
which the person to be arrested is, or in which there 
are reasonable grounds for believing him to be. 
Before making the break, the person shall demand 
admission and explain the purpose for which admi-
ssion is desired. Demand and explanation need not 
be given before breaking under the exceptions in 
section 77-7-6 or where there is reason to believe 
evidence will be secreted or destroyed. i*w 
77-7-9. Weapons may be taken from prisoner. 
Any person making an arrest may seize from the 
person arrested all weapons which he may have on 
or about his person. IW© 
77-7-10. Telegraph or telephone authorization of 
execution of arrest warrant. 
A n y mapstratc may , by an endorsement on a 
warrant c . arrest, authorize by telegraph, telephone 
or other reasonable means , its execut ion. A copy of 
the warrant or notice of its issuance and terms may * 
be sent t o one or more peace off icers. The copy or 
notice communicated authorizes the officer to 
proceed in the same manner under it as if he had a n 
original warrant. i§*" 
77-7 -11 . Possess ion o f warrant by arresting /« *^ 
off icer not required. * y„ 
A n y peace officer w h o has knowledge o f an out -* 
standing warrant o f arrest m a y arrest a person lie 
reasonably believes t o be the person described in t h e : 
warrant, without the peace officer having physical 
possession of the warrant. !*•§ 
77-7-21. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure UIAH CUDE 19*6 I W 
18, the peace officer or public official shall issue 
one copy to the person cited and shall within five 
days file a duplicate copy with the court specified in 
the citation. 
(2) Each copy of the citation issued under autho-
rity of this chapter shall contain: 
(a) The name of the court before which the 
person is to appear; 
(b) The name of the person cited; 
(c) A brief description of the offense charged; 
(d) The date, time and place at which the 
offense is alleged to have occurred; 
(e) The date on nhich the citation was issued: 
(f) The name of the peace officer or public 
official who issued the citation, and the name of the 
arresting person if an arrest v*as made by a private 
party and the citation was issued in lieu of taking 
the arrested person before a magistrate; 
(g) The time and date on or before and after 
which the person is to appear; 
(h) The address of the court in which the 
person is to appear; 
(i) A certification above the signature of the 
officer issuing the citation in substantially the foll-
owing language: "1 certify that a copy of this cita-
tion or information (Summons and Complaint) was 
duly served upon the defendant according to la* on 
the above date and I know or believe and so allege 
that the above-named defendant did commit the 
offense herein set forth contrary to law. I further 
cenify that the court to which the defendant has 
been'directed to appear is the proper court pursuant 
to section 77-7-21."; and 
(j) A notice containing substantially the follo-
wing language: 
R E A D CAREFULLY 
This citation is not an information and will not 
be used as an information without your consent. If 
an information is filed you will be provided a copy 
by the court. You MUST appear in court on or 
before the time set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL 
TO APPEAR A N INFORMATION WILL BE 
FILED A N D THE COURT MAY ISSUE A 
WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST. ino 
77-7-21. Proceeding on citation - Voluntary 
forfeiture of bail - Information, *hen required. 
(1) Whenever a citation is issued pursuant to the 
provisions of section 77-7-18, the copy of the 
citation filed with the magistrate may be used in lieu 
of an information to which the person cited may 
plead guilty or no contest and be sentenced or on 
which bail may be forfeited. With the magistrate's 
approval a person may voluntarily forfeit bail 
without appearance being required in any case of a 
class B misdemeanor or less. Such voluntary forfe-
iture of bail shall be entered as a conviction and 
treated the same as if the accused pleaded guilty. 
(2) If the person cited willfully fails to appear 
before a magistrate pursuant to a citation issued 
under section 77-7-18, or pleads not guilty to the 
offense charged, or does not deposit bail on or 
before the date set for his appearance, an informa-
tion shall be filed and proceedings held in accord-
ance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure and all 
other applicable provisions of this code* which inf-
ormation shall be deemed an original pleading; 
provided, however, that the person cited may by 
written agreement waive the filing of the informa-
tion and thereafter the prosecution may proceed on 
the citation notwithstanding any provisions to the 
contrary. im 
77-7-22. Failure to appear as misdemeanor. 
Any person who willfully fails to appear before a 
court pursuant to a citation issued under the provi-
sions of section 77-7-18 is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor, regardless of the disposition of the 
charge upon which he was originally cited. two 
77-7-23. Deliver) of prisoner arrested without 
warrant - Information - Violation as 
misdemeanor. 
When an arrest is made without a warrant by a 
peace officer or private person, the person arrested 
shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken to the 
magistrate in the precinct of the county or munici-
p a l ^ in which the offense occurred, and in infor-
mation, stating the charge against the person shall 
be made before such magistrate. In the event the 
magistrate of the precinct is not available, the arre-
sted person shall be taken before the available 
magistrate nearest to the scene of the alleged 
offense. Any officer or person violating any of the 
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. i9W 
Chapter 8. Lineups 
77-3-1. Order of magistrate - Grounds - Arrested 
suspect's appearance without order. 
77-S-2. Suspect's right to have atiornev present. 
77-8-3. Conduct of peace officer. 
77-S-4. Record of proceedings - Access bj suspect. 
77-S-l. Order of magistrate - Grounds -
Arrested suspect's appearance without order. 
(1) A magistrate may issue an order requiring a 
suspect to appear in a lineup when probable cause 
exists to believe a crime has been committed and 
there is reason to believe the suspect committed it. 
(2) A suspect who has been arrested, and is in 
custody, may be required by a peace officer to 
appear in a lineup without a court order. 
(3) Upon application of any suspect and a 
showing of good cause, a magistrate may order a 
lineup. ' 19*0 
77*8-2. Suspect's right to have attornej present. 
A suspect has the right to have his attorney 
present at any lineup. The magistrate or party in 
charge of the lineup shall notify the suspect of this 
right. Every suspect unable to employ counsel shall 
be entitled to representation by an attorney appoi-
nted by a magistrate for a lineup either before or 
after an arrest. i**o 
77-S-3. Conduct of peace officer. 
The peace officers conducting a lineup shall not 
attempt to influence the identification of any parti-
cular suspect. 1980 
77-S-4. Record of proceedings - Access bj 
suspect. 
The entire lineup procedure shall be recorded, 
including all conversations between the witnesses 
and the conducting peace officers. The suspect shall 
have access to and may make copies of the record 
and any photographs taken of him or any other 
persons in connection with the lineup. *9M 
Chapter 9. Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit 
77-M. Authority of peace officer of another state. 
77-9-2. Procedore after arrest.
 r. * 
77-9-3. Authority of peace officer of this state beyoad 
normal jurisdiction. 
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